Electoral competition with local externalities by Ianni, Antonella
ELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH LOCAL EXTERNALITIES
ANTONELLA IANNI
Abstract. We study a simple model of public opinion formation that posits
that interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dy-
namics of individual opinion choices, as well as in that of the aggregate process.
We then analyze the implication that these ndings have in terms of space-time
allocation of fundings in an electoral campaign, where two candidates run in a
winner-take-all election.
JEL: C72, C92, D83.
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes a simple stochastic dynamic process of public opinion for-
mation, by studying the way in which this evolves over space and over time. The
metaphor we use to describe the model is that of a process of pre-electoral opinion
formation, where individuals repeatedly form their own opinion as to which, out
of two, candidates to vote for, at the time when the election come. Voters may
be informed or uninformed. If informed, a voter is policy motivated and casts a
vote depending on the electoral platform of each candidate. If uninformed, a voter
is insuciently informed about policies (and/or uninterested) and casts a vote
depending on the congurations of voters in his or her neighbourhood. The fact
that neighbourhoods are overlapping introduces an element of heterogeneity across
voters. Candidates are policy motivated. The policy space is unidimensional, but
may also incorporate a spatial element that takes into account voters' address.
Issues related to the process of public opinion formation are in fact not tangential
to economic theory. Public opinion plays a key role in shaping animal spirits,
expectations, voting decisions, patterns of consumer and producer behaviour, as
well as dynamics of adoptions of dierent technologies and innovation. The process
of public opinion has also been extensively studied in elds other than economics.
Our model provides a formalization of two aspects that are often emphasized in
the sociological literature. The rst is the fact that individuals faced with dierent
choices as to whom - or what - to support show a tendency to be inuenced by the
opinion of some collective majority (mutual awareness, as dened in Crespi (1997)).
The second is that environmental conditions that are specic to each agent seem
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to matter in determining the outcome of individual choices (situational correlates
of opinion, as in Crespi (1997)). These features of the public opinion process seem
to be well documented in terms of experimental, as well as empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the model.
The collective processes of opinion formation rely on two main elements. First, it
is assumed that opinions are formed repeatedly over time in a sequential manner
(where only one voter at a time can revise or formulate an opinion). Second, the
behaviour of uninformed voters is endogeneized in terms of a simple statistic of the
opinions adopted in a voter's neighbourhood. The study of the process of public
opinion relies on the characterization of the long-run properties of the process,
as well as those of its dynamics. Section 3 analyses the ensued political equilib-
rium. Specically, we consider the implications of our model of public opinion on
the strategic incentives driving candidates' electoral camoaign. Finally Section 4
concludes and the Appendix contains the technical proofs.
2. The model
A single round of elections is going to be held at a future date, T. Two can-
didates, L and R, run and the winner will be decided through simple majority
voting
There is a countable set of voters, V . Each v 2 V is provided with a utility
function decreasing in the distance between the implemented policy  2 [0;1], and
her bliss point, v 2 [0;1]:
(1) u(;v) =   j    v j
Bliss points, v are randomly distributed with cdf F(v) and density f(v). Each
voter v 2 V is also provided with a location, v(x), i.e. an address on a 1-
dimensional lattice Z1. Addresses are xed and independent of preferences; bliss
points are xed and independent of the the spatial location, x.
The two candidates, L and R, propose a policy, denoted by l 2 [0;1] and r 2
[0;1]. After the elections take place, the policy proposed by the winning candidate
is implemented. Parties are policy motivated and have Euclidean preferences, with
bliss points 0 for party L and 1 for party R. Suppose parties propose policies (l;r)
with l < r, respectively.
When informed, a voter with bliss point v chooses candidate R i v  0:5(l+r).,
which occurs with probability 1   F(v  0:5(l + r)).
When uninformed, a voter located at x observes the opinion of a randomly
chosen nearest neighbours, i.e. any voters at locations y :j y x j= 1, and tends to
imitates it. If p(x;v) denotes the fraction of x's neighbours favouring party R, then
a voter who is uninformed voter will favour party R with probability g(p(x;v)).
The preference specication used to model choices of an informed voter is en-
tirely standard. The behavioural specication used to describe choices of an un-
informed voter is designed to capture the amount of correlation that seems toELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH LOCAL EXTERNALITIES 3
be particularly pertinent in processes of opinion formation and will be elaborated
further later.
2.1. Public Opinion Formation. As anticipated, we are going to model a dy-
namic process of public opinion formation, in which we take the voting specica-
tions as primitives.
The general notation of the model we study has individual x 2 V choosing
ballot v(x) 2 f0;1g, where v(x) = 1 (vs. v(x) = 0) denotes voter x supporting
candidate R (vs. L). We model the dynamics of the process where at each point
in time at most one individual changes opinion. To this aim, we assume that time
runs continuously and each individual may choose a new opinion at a random
exponential time, with mean one. The time-dependence of all variables will be
denoted by sub-t, but sometime dropped to lighten notation.
The dynamic aspect of the model stems from the fact that an uninformed voter's
probability of observing an opinion in favour of candidate R depends on x's address
and varies endogenously over time. Our general model assumes that the probability
that voter x's ballot favours candidate R, given that parties propose policies (l;r)
is:
Pr[vt(x) = 1 j (l;r)] = (1   )(1   F(
l + r
2
)) + gp(x;vt) (2)
where g(p(x;vt)) is dened as follows:
g(p(x;vt)) =
1
1 + exp[ 4(2p(x;vt)   1)]
(3)
and
p(x;vt) =
1
2
X
y:jy xj=1
vt(y) (4)
Note that, for any value of  < 1, g(0:5) = 0:5, 0 < g(0) < g(1) < 1) and
g(0) + g(1) = 1. We think of this specication as a noisy form of imitation, in
the sense that, for any  < 1 an uninformed voter is likely to imitate his or her
neighbours, but could do otherwise with positive, albeit small, probability. Clearly,
as  ! 1, g(p(x;vt)) ! p(x;vt), reecting the fact that behaviour is entirely
driven by the imitation of a randomly chosen neighbour.
Also, our assumptions ensure that the probability that more than one voter
revises opinion at the same time is negligible, since within a small time interval
dt:
Pr[vt+dt(x) = 1 j (l;r)] = Pr[vt(x) = 1 j (l;r)]dt + o(t)
The following Denition summarizes the details of the processes of public opinion
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Denition 1 (Public Opinion). Consider a population of voters denoted by V .
For any t  0, let t 2 [0;1], and g(p(x;vt)) dened in (3) . At each random
exponential time t, with mean one, voter x chooses ballot R at rate:
Pr[vt(x) = 1 j (l;r);] = (1   t)(1   F(
l + r
2
)) + tg(p(x;vt))
In general, we shall denote by vt 2 f0;1gV public opinion at time t, we shall
assume that V is countable and consists of a unidimensional lattice (i.e., a line),
and we are interested in characterizing its evolution over time and over space.1
 = 0 Voters are always Informed. Clearly, in the special case where t = 0
for all t, the model looses any spatial dimension and collapses to the standard
framework, with m : F(m) = 0:5 being the median voter. Each voter supports
party R with probability p(l;r)  1   F(l + r)=2 and the asymptotic behaviour
of the process of public opinion formation is described by the product measure of
mutually singular countable Markov chains.
 = 1 Voters are always Uninformed. Interesting questions arises in the case
when t = 1 for all t, as the stochastic process of public opinion formation is still
Markovian over its state-space (since any transition probability depends only on
the current conguration of opinions), although the behaviour of a single unin-
formed voter no longer is (due to the local nature of the interaction).
In words, the Theorem that follows asserts that in the absence of any informed
voter, the process admits an invariant measure that can be fully characterised.
Specically, this invariant measure posits higher limit probability to congurations
of public opinion where opinions among voters tend to be spatially homogenous.
Moreover, the process is ergodic, meaning that this invariant measure is unique and
independently of any initial condition, the process of public opinion will converge
to it over time.
Theorem 1. Consider the process of Public Opinion as in Denition (1). and
suppose t = 1 for all t  0.
The following measure is the unique invariant measure for the process:
(5) 
(v) = K exp[
X
x
X
fy:jy xj=1g
(2v(x)   1)(2v(y)   1)]
1In the statement of the results we use the following further notation. We shall denote any
probability distribution over the state space by t, and the initial distribution by 0. Degenerate
probability distributions that have pointmass on the congurations where all individuals adopt
exactly the same ballot (that is congurations v0 where v(x) = 0 for all x in V and conguration
v1 where v(x) = 1 for all x in V ) are denoted by 0 and 1 respectively: Given 0; we let 
0
t
be the law of v
0
t , and we write limt!1 
0
t = 0
1 to mean that 
0
t is weakly convergent. We
also denote by I the set of invariant measures (i.e. a measure that is stationary over time) for vt
and Ie  I the set its extreme points. We shall dene the process vt to be ergodic if and only if
I is a singleton; in this case the above limit will not depend on the initial condition, in the sense
that limt!1 
0
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where K is such that
P
v (v) = 1 and limt!1 
;0
t  
1 =  for any initial
distribution 0. Furthermore, for all , vi = fv0;v1g and v 6= vi:

1(v0)

1(v1)
= 1 and lim
!1

1(v)

1(vi)
= 0
Proof. See Appendix. 
The above Theorem provides a characterization of the limit behaviour of the
dynamics of public opinion when t = 1 at any point in time t. Given that, under
g(pt(x;v)), each uninformed voter can support either candidate with strictly pos-
itive probability, all possible transitions among dierent congurations can occur
with strictly positive probability and as a result, initial conditions become less
and less important along the dynamics and the process does not show any path
dependence. In addition, the process is monotonic or attractive, in the sense that
voters tend to agree in opinion with their nearest neighbours. As the limit dis-
tribution (5) has full support, each of the possible congurations of opinions in
the population can be observed in the limit. However, it is clear from the above
formulation that some congurations are more likely to be observed than others.
To see this, notice that the sum of which in the square brackets of (5) is taken
over all couples of nearest neighbours, and as the addendum is equal to one if and
only if v(x) = v(y), the two congurations which are more likely to be observed
are those where every voter chooses exactly the same opinion, i.e. v0 and v1.
It is clear that this reasoning only relies on a comparative statics exercise over
the limit distributions of a sequence of identical processes, that dier only in the
parameter , obtained by taking the limit for  ! 1 of the limit distribution
obtained for t ! 1. To gain a better understanding of the dynamics, what we do
next is to reverse the order of the limits, by rst looking at the limit for  ! 1 and
second at what happens along the dynamics of this process (i.e. asymptotically
for t ! 1).
Theorem 2. Consider the process of Public Opinion as in Denition (1). Take
 = 1 and suppose t = 1 for all t > 0.
For z 2 [0;1], let   z be the product measure with density z, i.e. zfv(x) =
1g = z for all x 2 V . Suppose that the process is started with z at time 0. Then
the process is path dependent and:
Ie = f
0;
1g and lim
t!1
z
t = (1   z)
0 + z
1
Furthermore, convergence obtains at rate
p
t
Proof. See Appendix. 
The above result shows that if voters are uninformed and formulate an opinion
simply by imitation one of their neighbours (which, with our parameters, corre-
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since both congurations where all voters adopt the same opinion are invariant for
the process. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, these are the only two invariant
measures for the process, and we are able to characterize their basins of attrac-
tion in terms of the initial condition: if z is the probability with which each voter
favours candidate R at time 0, then z also identies the set of initial conditions
that lead the process of public opinion to asymptotically show uniform agreement
on candidate R.
One thing worth noticing is that, along the dynamics, the process shows consen-
sus, in that if we look at any possible couple of voters, x and y in V , the probability
that they choose dierent opinions approaches zero asymptotically:
lim
t!1Pr[vt(x) 6= vt(y)] = 0 for all x and y in V
Clearly, for any z 2 (0;1), each single voter may change her or his opinion
innitely many times (as limt!1 vt(x) does not necessarily exist). However, as a
result of the above considerations, the observed frequencies of individuals choosing
the same opinion grows, in probability, over time.
Since our process is dened in the two dimensions of time and space, we can
relate these two dimensions in a space-time analysis, by looking at the emerging
clustering process. With the term \cluster" we mean a connected group of indi-
viduals holding the same opinion, and measure it by the length of a segment with
all connected individuals of the same opinion. In order to see how the size of a
cluster increases with time, we can express the length of a cluster as a function
of t. The result we obtain state that consensus grows slowly, at rate
p
t. This
means that, for t large, any cluster of voters supporting the same candidate tends
to be almost stationary, in the sense that the rate at which it changes is slower
than the rate at which time changes. In other words, although the process we
analyse does not admit any stationary distribution where both opinion co-exist
indenitely, any such conguration can indeed be observed along the dynamics,
and when viewed locally, remains almost stationary. Notice that the study of this
clustering process, and the associated space-time analysis can only be done relying
on the local specication of the model.
3. Political Equilibrium and the allocation of funding in an
electoral campaign
Parties are policy motivated and aim at maximizing expected utility. Given poli-
cies (l;r), and bliss points (xL;xR), let Pr[v(x) = R j (l;r)] denote the probability
that voter x casts a vote in favour of R. The expected support for candidate R is
then
P
v2V Pr[v(x) = R j (l;r)]  R(l;r) and the expected support for candidate
L is
P
v2V Pr[v(x) = L j (l;r)]  L(l;r) 2. A Political Equilibrium is dened as
follows:
2Since our model allows for a countable population of agents, an equivalent formulation would
rely on share of the votes to be intended as the limit of its natural restriction to [ N;N] asELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH LOCAL EXTERNALITIES 7
Denition 2 (Political Equilibrium). A Political Equilibrium is a pair of policy
choices, (l;r) such that l 2 argmaxl uL(l:r) and r 2 argmaxr uR(l:r), where
uL(l:r) and uR(l;r) are given by:
uL(l;r) = L(l;r)(  j l   xL j) + R(l;r)(  j l   xL j)
uR(l;r) = L(l;r)(  j l   xR j) + R(l;r)(  j l   xR j)
Voters are Informed at time 0, but Uninformed at time t > 0.
0 = 0; t = 1 8t > 0. Since the process is ergodic, no matter where the
process starts, the probability with which each conguration could be observed
asymptotically is given by the limit distribution in (5). Notice that, since this is
true for any initial condition, this is also true for a specic initial condition where,
for example, each voter initially supports party R with probability p(l;r)  1  
F(l+r)=2, as any informed voter would choose to do, upon candidates announcing
policies (l;r). This formally corresponds to the case where 0  p, that is a
product measure with density p (such that pfv(x) = 1g = p for all x 2 V . Hence,
if voters' behaviour were policy motivated at time t = 0, but became driven by
neighbours' preferences from then on (for any t > 0), then limit behaviour of
the public opinion process will be entirely unaected by the initial condition. In
an analogous manner, if policies were to be announced at a nite point in time
0 < T < 1 and taken into account (with weight 0 <   1) by all informed voters
at any time t > T, the asymptotic properties of the process of public opinion would
not be aected. does not aect the ergodicity properties of the process. However,
as detailed in the proof, if some strictly positive weight (0 <  < 1) is given to
policy considerations in each of the voters' assessments, the reversibility properties
upon which the full characterization relies fail to hold.
As the dynamics we studied are specied over time and over space, natural
questions to be addressed relate to the optimal spatial allocation of funding in an
electoral campaign (i.e. among dierent districts or dierent states), as well as to
the optimal timing of such allocation (i.e. between the time when the elections are
called and the time just before the elections are actually held). Although a formal
treatment of these interesting questions warrants future research, in what follows
we elaborate on the insights that the model we studied in this paper provides.
The rst thing that all specications of our model show is that the spatial distri-
bution of votes matters in the long run, as well as in the short run. In particular,
simply by looking at the limit distribution for the ergodic process generated by
the dynamics of the noisy conformist voters model, as in Theorem 1, it is easy
to see that the limit probability of each conguration depends on the opinions
chosen in its connected components, and not on the frequency with which opin-
ions are adopted in the population. For example, in a one-dimensional setting,
N ! 1 whenever this limit exists. As it will become clear, this will not play a key role in our
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consider two congurations, vnc
A and vnc
B , identical at all sites apart from the sites
fx   2;x   1;x;x + 1g which are as follows:
vA : :::: v(x   2) = 1 v(x   1) = 0 v(x) = 1 v(x + 1) = 0 ::::
vB : :::: v(x   2) = 1 v(x   1) = 1 v(x) = 0 v(x + 1) = 0 ::::
From Theorem 1 we infer that the limit probabilities of these congurations (where
the frequencies of 1s is exactly the same) are respectively:

1(vA) / exp[ 6]

1(vB) / exp[2]
Conguration vB is given higher probability, as more coordinates agree with their
neighbouring coordinates. These considerations clearly relate to the long-run dis-
tribution of the process, but the insight applies to its dynamics as well, as can
be seen by looking at the dynamics of the specication of the model in terms of
conformist voters, to which we focus next.
Much of the descriptive and normative literature on elections in political science
identies at least two alternative basic rules that a candidate may follow when
deciding where to allocate resources (in terms of money, as well as time spent
campaigning) among dierent constituencies or states. The rst posits that a
candidate should allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the electoral
votes of each state (Brams and Davis (1974)). The second suggests that candidates
should mostly be concerned with the likelihood that resources can swing a state
from one candidate to another, and by this advocates a competitive allocation of
resources to be directed to the `marginal' states (Colantoni et al. (1974)). With
some heroic simplications, we can translate these two alternatives into the set-
up of our model, by asking the following question: suppose a candidate had the
possibility to buy one vote (i.e. to buy the support of one voter), would (s)he rather
do so within a cluster of voters who support the other candidate, or exactly at the
border of a cluster? It turns out that, even in the absence of a poll, our model
suggests that the best alternative is this latter possibility. To see this, consider
the following conguration, v, that has a border at x, in that v(x   1) 6= v(x):
:::: v(x   2) = 1 v(x   1) = 1 v(x) = 0 v(x + 1) = 0 v(x + 2) = 0 ::::
Suppose, for simplicity, that the process is started deterministically at cong-
uration v. In this case the duality equation (10) (see the proof of Theorem 2 in
the Appendix) states that the probability that starting from conguration v, the
voter at site x supports candidate 1 is: Evvt(x) =
P
y pt(x;y)v(y), which, applied
to the subset fx   1;x;x + 1g; becomes:
E
v[vt(x 1)+vt(x)+vt(x+1)] =
X
y
pt(x 1;y)v(y)+
X
y
pt(x;y)v(y)+
X
y
pt(x+1;y)v(y)
The above probabilities are given explicitly in equation (9), and it is not dicult
to see that, for any 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p(0)(x;x + 1) = p(0)(x;x   1) = 1
2:
1
2
 pt(x;x + 1)   pt(x;x + j) > 0 8j > 1
formalizing the fact that a voter's opinion is more strongly aected by the opinions
held in the neighbourhood than by opinions held further away.
If we take into account of this fact, and we denote pt(x;x + 1) as p, we can
re-write the above equation as:
E
v[vt(x   1) + vt(x) + vt(x + 1)]  p[v(x   2) + v(x   1) + 2v(x) + v(x + 1) + v(x + 2)]
= p[1 + 1 + 2v(x) + v(x + 1) + v(x + 2)]
Hence, by buying the vote of voter x, candidate 1 increases the probability that
at time t voters in fx   1;x;x + 1g support her or him by twice as much as (s)he
would do by buying the vote of voter x + 1 or voter x + 2. This is because by
moving the border of a cluster by one voter, the candidate guarantees stability of
the area inside the cluster, that being inward looking is not so exposed to sudden
swings in opinions.
The importance of electoral poll, or analog quantiable messages that candidates
may send to the electorate, are made quite clear in the main results of this paper.
If voters behaviour is aected by some noise (in the specication of the model in
terms of noisy conformist voters and in the results of Theorem 1), the eect of an
electoral poll is somewhat limited, since the noisy component of private information
gathering de facto determines the asymptotic properties of the process, and these
are only partially aected by a poll. However, if and when voters' behaviour
is not noisy, or in any case when such noise disappears in the limit (as in the
specication of the model in terms of conformist voters), the importance of a
poll becomes paramount. Even if such message is only taken into account at an
early stage of the electoral campaign and disregarded by voters forever after (as
in Theorem ??, Part 2.), due to the underlying monotonicity properties of the
process of public opinion, the poll determines the basins of attraction of the two
limit distributions that, we recall, show consensus, as well as the lower and upper
bound of the expected minimum cluster size (Remark ??, statement a.). Hence the
model suggests that what happens at the very beginning of an electoral campaign
has a very strong eect on its later developments, and raises the incentive for a
candidate to invest campaign resources on whatever is deemed to have any power
to aect the initial distribution. Loosely speaking, a very good opening speech in
an electoral campaign, or some primary results, have a long lasting eect on the
process of public opinion: although they do not determine the nal outcome (since
the process is path-dependent), they directly aect the probability with which a
candidate achieves uniform support in the electorate.
If the poll is repeatedly taken into account by voters in their opinion formation
process, then it not only singles out one conguration as the only asymptotic
outcome (Theorem ??, Part 3.), but it also increases the rate at which support10 ANTONELLA IANNI
grows in the population (Remark ??) from
p
t to at least t. This clearly emphasizes
the importance of the last electoral poll in an electoral campaign and formalizes
an incentive, on the part of candidates, to invest resources in producing a last
electoral poll, as close as possible to the date of the elections.
A further insight that the model provides relates to the optimal timing of re-
source allocations in an electoral campaign. As we showed before, in the con-
formist voter model when only an initial poll is made available, the process is
path-dependent, as its long run behaviour depends crucially on the initial distri-
bution. Along the dynamics, in the absence of any further poll, clusters emerge
and are almost stationary when viewed locally, since their rate of growth is of
probability order
p
t: It is instructive to interpret the numerical lower and an up-
per bound available for the expected mean cluster size. To this aim, consider a
process that starts with an initial distribution where each voter chooses opinion 1
with probability, say,  = 0:5: As choices are initially independent, clearly, at time
zero, the probability of observing a cluster of k = 100 voters with the same opinion
is 2 100. As the process evolves, however, choices show a certain amount of spatial
correlation. For t ! 1 the mean cluster size, re-scaled by
p
t, will converge to
a limit that lies between 2
p
 = 3:5449 and 4
p
 = 7:0898. Hence a cluster of
k = 100 voters could be approximately observed as early as after t = 198:94,
and is on average not going to vary until t = 795:78. In other words, in order
to observe the cluster size to double (say from k = 100 to k = 200), the process
needs to go through four times as many periods (say from t  200 to t  800).
Simple calculus shows that the lower and the upper bound of the (limiting) mean
cluster size are convex in  and symmetric around  = 0:5. Hence for  6= 0:5 a
cluster of a given mean size is likely to be observed earlier than if  was 0:5 and
is likely to `persist' for a relatively longer spell of time. Hence, conditional on a
candidate winning the elections, the higher is , the lower is the number of time
periods that are necessary to achieve a given minimum expected cluster size of
votes in her or his favour, and the longer is the spell of time within which his or
her electoral support is going to remain almost stationary. Hence, if a candidate
could gather some information about the current distribution of potential votes
and if this was favourable to her or him, then delaying the date of the elections
could have a detrimental eect on the outcome.
These last considerations seem to suggest that a linear allocation of funding
over time during an electoral campaign might not be fully and always optimal,
since the returns in terms of growing support in the electorate are determined by
the properties of the dynamics of the process of public opinion and these may be
endogenously aected by candidates. It is however clear that considerations of
this sort require an explicit account of the strategic interaction between the two
candidates, which at present is not part of the model.ELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH LOCAL EXTERNALITIES 11
An important assumption that we have maintained throughout all of this paper
is that voters are homogenous in their behaviour and the only form of heterogene-
ity in the opinions that are chosen stems endogenously from the conguration of
other agents' opinions at the time choices are to be made. One important exten-
sion one may consider is to allow for modelled heterogeneities among voters, other
than those stemming from the local nature of information. This is particularly
interesting in the light of a recent line of research in the eld of Political Econ-
omy that focuses on the social eects of preference falsication (T. Kuran (1997)
provides a very insightful study3), where the opinion reported in public may not
reect true preferences due to social pressures or peer considerations. Our model
may capture some aspects pertinent to this approach, once we allow for hetero-
geneous preferences among voters. We outline below two ways in which this may
occur.
In the rst case we assume conformist voters, located on a one-dimensional
lattice sampling opinions among their nearest neighbours and no electoral poll.
The form of heterogeneity we consider relates to voters' behaviour when facing an
equal distribution of opinions within their neighbours: while a conformist voter as
in our Denition ?? would toss a fair coin, now a type-1 voter chooses opinion 1,
while a type-0 voter chooses opinion 0. This formalizes the idea that peer pressure
are strong enough to fully determine opinions for a voter who is surrounded by
all neighbours choosing the same opinion, but that in the absence of a strict
majority within the neighbourhood, a voter's type determines one's choice. This
seemingly innocent asymmetry in behaviour alters substantially the asymptotics of
the process of public opinion, in that although consensus may still obtain, whenever
both types exist in the population of voters, innitely many congurations where
both opinions co-exist may also be absorbing for the dynamics. To see this notice
that a border between a cluster of at least two ones and a cluster of at least
two zeros, where bordering voters are a type-0 and a type-1 respectively, is stable
(in that no voter would ip). Hence the process admits innitely many possible
absorbing states where both opinions co-exist.
In the second case conformist voters are heterogenous in terms of the poll they
account for in determining their opinion: suppose 0 <  < 1 and that type-1 voter
receive  = 1, type-0 voters receive  = 0. In fact, we may take  = f1;0g to
represent a voter true preferences and  to measure the weight given to social pres-
sures that may lead to preference falsication. Looking at the implied ip rates, it
is not dicult to see that a type-1 (vs. type-0) voter would choose opinion 1 (vs.
opinion 0) with probability one if and only if (s)he is surrounded by all neighbours
choosing opinion 1 (vs. opinion 0). In all other cases the probability of choosing
an opinion is strictly between zero and one and is increasing in the number of
neighbours choosing the same opinion. This means that, for example, a type-1
3We are grateful to an anonymous referee of a previous version of this paper and to A. Hamlin
for drawing this book to our attention.12 ANTONELLA IANNI
voter surrounded by all zeros ips to opinion zero at rate : As a result, when-
ever both types exist in the population, the system admits no absorbing states.
We conjecture that since this process is attractive, it may still display clustering.
It is however not clear how the invariant measures could be characterized since
reversibility fails to hold in this case.
4. Conclusions and some related issues
This paper analyses a simple model of public opinion formation that posits that
interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of
individual opinions, as well as in that of the aggregate process. Bandwagons emerge
due to the local nature of information gathering and the potential heterogeneity in
behaviour that this entails. We show however that in dierent specications of the
model, the process tends asymptotically to show consensus on one of the two com-
peting opinions, meaning that initial correlation of opinions among agents tends
to vanish over time. We consider the eects on the process of opinion formation
of a publicly available poll and show that this may lead to a form of contagion,
by which public opinion tends to agree with the poll. In the absence of a poll,
the process displays the feature that, after long time spans, a sequence of states
occur which remain almost stationary and, when viewed locally, are characterized
by large clusters of individuals who hold the same opinion.ELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH LOCAL EXTERNALITIES 13
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
1. (characterization of the invariant measure) We start by looking at the one-
dimensional case, i.e. for d = 1 and we claim that the following measure is invariant
for the process vnc(m) for any m < 1:


1(v) = K exp[
X
x
X
fy:ky xk=1g
(2v(x)   1)(2v(y)   1)]
where K = f
P
v exp[
P
x
P
fy:ky xk=1g (2v(x) 1)(2v(y) 1)]g 1 and  = 1
4 log(22(m+1) 
1):
We re-write the transition probabilities of which in equation (??) by substituting
 = 1
4 log(22(m+1)   1):
Pr
nc[1 j m;p(x;v)]  Pr
nc[1 j ;p(x;v)] = (6)
=
1
1 + exp[ 4(2p(x;v)   1)]
(7)
where we recall p(x;v) = 1
2
P
y:ky xk=1 v(y) and, since S = Z1, it takes values in
f0;1=2;1g. For example, if p(x;v) = 0 the above equation states that the proba-
bility that opinion 1 is chosen is given by [1 + exp[4]] 1 = [1 + exp[log[22(m+1)  
1]]] 1 = (22(m+1)) 1, which corresponds exactly to (??) for p = 0.
To prove the assert, it suces to notice that the above measure is reversible, in
that:
Pr
nc[1 j ; p(x;v); v(x) = 0]

1(vx=0) = Pr
nc[0 j ; p(x;v); v(x) = 1]

1(vx=1)
where the two congurations vx=0 and vx=1 dier only in the coordinate x (i.e.
vx=0(x) = 0;vx=1(x) = 1 and vx=0(y) = vx=1(y) for all y 6= x):

1(vx=1)

1(vx=0)
= exp[2
X
fy:ky xk=1g
(2v(y)   1)]
=
1
1 + exp[ 2
P
fy:ky xk=1g(2v(y)   1)]

 [
1
1 + exp[2
P
fy:ky xk=1g(2v(y)   1)]
]
 1
=
Pr nc[1 j ; p(x;v); v(x) = 0]
Pr nc[0 j ; p(x;v); v(x) = 1]
The same logic applies to the case where 1 < d < 1. In this case, for any
given m < 1 and for p  p(x;v) = (2d) 1 P
fy:ky xk=1g v(y) which takes values in14 ANTONELLA IANNI
f0;(2d) 1;2(2d) 1;::::;1g, reversibility requires:

(m)
1 (vx=1)

(m)
1 (vx=0)
= exp[4
(m)(p)d(2p   1)]
=
1
1 + exp[ 2(m)(p)d
P
fy:ky xk=1g(2v(y)   1)]

 [
1
1 + exp[2(m)(p)d
P
fy:ky xk=1g(2v(y)   1)]
]
 1
=
Pr nc[1 j p;m; v(x) = 0]
Pr nc[0 j p;m; v(x) = 1]

Pr nc[1 j p;m]
1   Pr nc[1 j p;m]
where Pr nc[1 j p;m] is as in equation (??). Hence (m)(p) solves the following
equation:
Pr nc[1 j p;m]
1   Pr nc[1 j p;m]
= exp[4
(m)(p)d(2p   1)]
This equation has a unique solution for any p 6= 0:5 given by:

(m)(p) =
log[Pr nc[1 j p;m]   log[1   Pr nc[1 j p;m]]
4d(2p   1)
If p = 0:5, since Pr nc[1 j p = 0:5;m] = 0:5 for any m, any nite value of  satises
the above equation. It can be shown that (m)(p) is symmetric, in the sense that
(m)(p) = (m)(1   p): Hence, for any given d, (m)(p) is fully characterized by d
values. In fact, for d = 1, its domain is restricted tof0;0:5;1g and its co-domain
is fully characterized by the parameter  = 1
4 log(22(m+1)   1), as used in the rst
part of this proof.
2. (ergodicity) We interpret the process vnc as a system of interactive, nearest
neighbours, particles on the state space S.
We look rst at the case where j S j S < 1: For convenience, and in order
to assume away bordering conditions (where, since there are only nitely many
voters, a voter would be surrounded by only d neighbours, as opposed to 2d), we
think of the lattice Zd as folded to form the torus (S) = Zd \ [ S=2;S=2]d for
S = 2;4;:::::.
The process vnc moves on the nite state space of all congurations v 2 f0;1g(S).
In the model, at any point in time, at most one voter may choose to revise her or
his opinion. When (s)he does so, (s)he behaves according to equation (??), which
we recall only depends on m, p(x;v),  and  and are homogeneous over time.
Hence the dynamics is generated by the following ip rates, c(x;v) that dene the
probability with which coordinate x ips, from v(x) to 1 v(x), when the process
is in state v:
c
nc(x;v;;;m) = v(x) + (1   2v(x))[Pr
nc[1 j p(x;v);m] + (1   )]
where v(x) = f0;1g and Pr nc[1 j p;m] is as in equation (??).ELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH LOCAL EXTERNALITIES 15
It can easily be checked that for any value of (;) 2 (0;1]  [0;1], since 0 <
Pr nc[1 j p;m] < 1 for m < 1, these ip rates are strictly positive. Hence,
transition probabilities are strictly positive from each state to all, and only, the
states that dier from that state by at most one coordinate. Hence we may regard
the process as a nite-state Markov chain, and conclude that, since starting from
one state, the process can reach any other state in at most S < 1 steps, the
process is ergodic.
Whenever S = Zd is countable, but possibly innite, so is the state space of the
process vnc and hence the above logic does not hold. We proceed as follows. We
rst show that the process is attractive (or monotonic) in that coordinates tend
to agree with neighbouring coordinates. We then use a result stating that, in Z1,
a sucient condition for an attractive system with a countable state-space to be
ergodic, is that the transition probabilities that generate the process be strictly
positive (as we already know they are).
We introduce the following partial order on f0;1gZ1. We say that, for ; 2
f0;1gZ1,    if (x)  (x) for all x 2 Z1. Then a process is dened to be
attractive if, whenever    ip rates satisfy the following:
c(x;;;;m)  c(x;;;;m) if (x) = (x) = 0
c(x;;;;m)  c(x;;;;m) if (x) = (x) = 1
Since for any   ; p(x;)  p(x;); also Pr nc[1 j p(x;);m]  Pr nc[1 j p(x;);m]
for any m. Hence, the process is attractive. For example, for d =  = 1, ip rates
expressed as a function of  < 1 are:
c
nc(x;v;) 

Pr nc[1 j ; p(x;v);v(x) = 0] = [1 + exp[ 4(2p(x;v)   1)]]
 1 if v(x) = 0
Pr nc[0 j ; p(x;v);v(x) = 1] = [1 + exp[4(2p(x;v)   1)]]
 1 if v(x) = 1
or:
c
nc(x;v;) =
1
1 + exp[ 4(1   2v(x))(2p(x;v)   1)]
and it can easily be checked that attractivity is guaranteed.
As proved in Gray (1982) (and reported, for example, in Liggett (1985), as
Theorem 3.14, p.152), this is a sucient condition for ergodicity. Hence, the set
of invariant measures, I, for the process vnc(m); with m < 1, is a singleton.
As a result, for t   = 1 for all t > 0, the only such measure is the one
identied in Part 1. of this proof and the last statement of Part 2. of the Theorem
follows.
Notice that for any t   < 1 for all t > 0, the reversibility properties we
used in Part 1. of the proof only hold for  = 0:5 (since in any other case
Pr nc[1 j p = 0;m] + (1   ) + [Pr nc[1 j p = 1;m] + (1   )] 6= 1, thus
formalizing an asymmetry in the ip rates).
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1. Recall that the processes vnc(m) and vc(m) are ultimately dened by the
transition probabilities of which in (??) and (??) respectively. Hence, we only
need to show that limm!1 Pr nc[1 j m;p] = limm!1 Pr c[1 j m;p] for any given
p  p(x;v)  i=2d for i 2 f0;1;::::;2dg.
For d = 1, this is trivial, since Pr nc[1 j m;p = 0] = 2 2(m+1), Pr nc[1 j m;p =
0:5] = 0:5 and Pr nc[1 j m;p = 1] = 1   2 2(m+1) and, over f0; 1
2;1g and for all m,
Pr c[1 j m;p = 0] = 0, Pr c[1 j m;p = 0:5] = 0:5 and Pr c[1 j m;p = 1] = 1.
For d > 1, we show that convergence obtains over all values of p:
j Pr
nc[1 j m;p]   Pr
c[1 j m;p] j
 j
2m+1 X
r=0

2m + 1
r

p
r(1   p)
2m+1 r  
2m+1 X
r=m+1

2m + 1
r

p
r(1   p)
2m+1 r j=
=
m X
r=0

2m + 1
r

p
r(1   p)
2m+1 r 
1
2m
which goes to 0 for m ! 1.
To characterize this limit, notice that, Pr c[1 j m;p] is symmetric around p = 0:5,
in that Pr c[1 j m;p] = 1   Pr c[1 j m;1   p]. Hence it suces to show that, for all
0 < p < 0:5, limm!1 Pr c[1 j m;p] = 0. To this aim, notice that, for 0 < p < 0:5,
this is a sum of m decreasing terms. Hence:
0 < Pr
c[1 j m;p]  m

2m + 1
m + 1

p
m+1(1   p)
m
0 < lim m!1 Pr
c[1 j m;p]  lim m!1m

2m + 1
m + 1

p
m+1(1   p)
m = 0
thus concluding the proof.
2. Since  = 0 at t = 0 the initial condition fo the process is given by the
product measure 0. Since  = 1 for all t > 0 ip rates for this process are:
c
c(x;v) = v(x) + Pr
c[1 j m;p(x;v)](1   2v(x))
for v(x) 2 f0;1g and Pr c[1 j m;p(x;v)] as in equation (??). Since d = 1, p(x;v) =
(2) 1 P
fy:ky xk=1g v(y) 2 f0;1=2;1g and over these values Pr c[1 j m;p(x;v)] 
p(x;v) for all m  0. As a result:
(8) c
c(x;v) = v(x) + p(x;v)(1   2v(x))
By simple inspection of the ip rates that dene the process it is clear that
any state for which v(x) = v(y) for all x;y in S is stationary for the process.
Clearly, for this process vc, I  Ie  f0;1g. Hence, the result relies on the
proof that these are the only two extreme invariant measures (i.e. Ie  f0;1g),
so that, as I is a convex set, any other invariant measure is fully characterized.
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invariant measure, depend on the stochastic initial condition given by the product
measure 0, and limt!1 
0
t = (1   0)0 + 01.
We make use of results that are well known in the statistical literature on the
Voter's model (Liggett (1985), Section 1 and 3, Chapter V or in Bramson and
Grieath (1980)) that our model reproduces for this specication of the parame-
ters. In the Voter's model, a voter at x 2 Zd changes his opinion at an exponential
rate (with mean one) proportional to the number of 2d nearest neighbours with
the opposite opinion. If 2d neighbours disagree with the person at x, the ip rate
is 1. It can be seen by equation (8) that this is exactly the dynamics of our model.
As the logic of the proofs is interesting in its own right, we sketch the proof in
what follows.
The process vc can be studied in terms of its dual process in terms of coalescing
random walks. The duality relation transforms questions about vc in questions
concerning the cardinality of the coalescing random walk system.
We rst show that such duality can be used, by checking the conditions of which
in equation. (4.3) (p. 158) in Liggett (1985). To this aim, note that, at any t > 0,
the ip rates of equation (8) can be written as:
c
c(x;v) = (1   v(x)) + (2v(x)   1)
X
fy:ky xk=1g
1
2
(1   v(y))
These coincide with equation. (4.3) (p. 158) in Liggett (1985), once we take
c(x) = 1, A = fyg and p(x;A) = p(x;y) = 1=2 if y :k y   x k= 1 and zero
otherwise.
The dual process is a system of countably many continuous time, symmetric
random walks that jump after an exponential mean-1 holding time, with proba-
bilities p(x;x + 1) = p(x;x   1) = 1=2. Whenever two random walks meet (i.e. if
one jumps to a site that is already occupied), then they coalesce, i.e. they merge
into one. In particular, any such random walk denes a continuous time Markov
chain, X(t), with transition probabilities:
(9) pt(x;y) = e
 t
1 X
n=0
tn
n!
p
(n)(x;y)
where p(n)(x;y) are the n-step transition probabilities associated with p(x;y). Any
system of nitely many independent copies of X(t); where any two merge whenever
they meet, denes a system of nitely many coalescing Markov chains over the state
space of all nite subsets of S = Z1.
We denote by At the system of coalescing random walks at time t, that started
at time zero in the nite subset A  S. For any such subset A, let:
gt(A) = Pr
A[j At j<j A j for some t  0]
This represents a measure of how far apart the single processes are. Clearly, for
any t, gt(A) = 0 when j A j= 1, as a single recurrent random walk is never going18 ANTONELLA IANNI
to die. If j A j= 2, gt(A) !t!1 1; meaning that two recurrent random walks
will tend to meet and coalesce, as time grows, and possibly only asymptotically.
In order to shorten an otherwise very long proof, we shall however assume that
gt(A) = 1 when j A j= 2 for some t < 1.
Let A = fx 2 S : v(x) = 1 for all x 2 Ag and, for  being a probability
measure on f0;1gS, let (A) = fv : v(x) = 1 for all x 2 Ag. Then the duality
equation can be stated as follows (see equation. 1.7, p. 230 in Liggett (1985)):
(10) t(A) = E
A(At)
where t(A) is the probability that the process vt has vt(x) = 1 for all x 2 A and
EA(At) is the probability that j At j random walks, started at A, are still alive
at time t.
By using this duality relation, we now show that, given a product measure ,
limt!1 

t = (1   )0 + 1.
To characterize the basins of attraction of fv0;v1g, suppose the process vc is
started (stochastically) with product measure . If  is the rst time that j At j= 1
(which is nite with probability one by our assumption that gt(A) = 1 when
j A j= 2) the duality equation (10) implies that:
lim
t!1E
A(At) = E
A[lim
t!1E
A(At)]
Applying this again to A = fxg we obtain:
lim
t!1
X
y
pt(x;y)(fyg) =  for all x 2 S
But, by part (b) of Theorem 1.9 in Liggett (1985) (p. 231), this is a necessary and
sucient condition for limt!1 
t ! (1 )0 +1 to be true. Hence, for  = 0
the assert follows.
3. We follow the same logic we used in Part 2. of the proof of Theorem 1 for
the case of S = Z1. Flip rates for this model can be written as:
(11) c
c(x;v;;;m) = v(x) + (1   2v(x))[Pr
c[1 j p(x;v);m] + (1   )]
for v(x) = f0;1g where Pr c[1 j p(x;v);m] is given in equation (??). Attractivity
is, again, guaranteed by the fact that, for any m, Pr c[1 j p;m] is increasing in p.
Hence the process is ergodic if these ip rates are strictly positive.
Recall that  2 (0;1) by assumption. Since, for all m, Pr c[1 j p = 0;m] = 0 and
Pr c[1 j p = 1;m] = 1, it is clear that, for any  2 (0;1), 0 < cc(x;v;;;m) < 1,
which guarantees ergodicity in this case. For  2 f0;1g ergodicity is proven next.
We prove the statement for  = 1. (The proof for  = 0 is entirely analog).
In this case the conguration v1 = fv 2 f0;1gZ1 : v(x) = 1g is absorbing, since,
form the ip rates of which in (11), no voter would chance opinion. Moreover, this
would be the only absorbing state, since in any other con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for whom p(x;v) < 1; could ip with positive probability. Since the state-space
of the process vc on Z1 is only countable, ergodicity might still fail to hold4.
Let SN be nite sets that increase to S; such that limN!1 SN = S: Dene the
following ip rates:
c
c;N
i (x;v;;;m) =
8
<
:
cc(x;v(x)i;;;m) if x 2 SN
0 if x = 2 SN and v(x) = i
1 if x = 2 SN and v(x) 6= i
with v(x)i = v(x) for x 2 SN; and v(x) = i for x = 2 SN; i 2 f0;1g:
Denote the process with ip rates c
c;N
i (x;v;;;m) by Si;N(t); where Si;N(t) is
equal to the original process for x 2 SN; and characterized by all coordinates set
equal to i for x = 2 SN: Let 0S0;N(t) be the law of the process characterized by ip
rates c
c;N
0 (x;v;;;m) when the initial distribution is given by all 0 at time 0 and
let 1S1;N(t) be the law of the process characterized by ip rates c
c;N
1 (x;v;;;m)
when the initial distribution is given by all 1 at time 0: As cc(x;v(x);;;m) is
attractive, by Theorem 2.7 in Liggett (1985), also c
c;N
i (x;v;;;m) are attractive
and

0S0;N(t)  
S(t)  
1S1;N(t)
for  2 (0;1); and
lim
N!1
lim
t!1
0S0;N(t) = lim
t!1
0S(t)
lim
N!1
lim
t!1
1S1;N(t) = lim
t!1
1S(t)
Now limt!1 0S0;N(t) = limt!1 1S1;N = 1;N; that is, as t ! 1; indepen-
dently of the initial distribution, the process restricted on SN converges to a con-
guration all ones. In fact Si;N(t) is a nite Markov chain over SN; and as there is a
unique absorbing state (v1
N  fv(x) = 1 for all x 2 SNg) we know that the unique
ergodic distribution posits pointmass one on this state. As limN!1 SN = S; il
follows that
lim
N!1
lim
t!1
0S0;N(t) = lim
N!1
lim
t!1
1S1;N(t) = lim
N!1

1;N = 
1
The desired result then follows.
Proof of Remark ??
4The intuition why this could be so, is as follows. Suppose the process starts at v0 = fv 2
f0;1gZ
1
: v(x) = 0g. An occasional v(x) = 1 appears and, when it does so, it may grow into a
block of 1s. But if (1 ) is small, the length of the block of 1s surrounded by 0s may grow at a
negative rate. The process is described approximately by a countable positive recurrent Markov
chain over the number of 0s, (0;1;2;:::::g, absorbed at 0 after a time with nite expected value.
If (1   ) (the rate of production of 1s) is small relative to this expected time, then one may
expect the limit distribution for t ! 1, to be dierent from 1. Hence the process would not
be ergodic. Hence we need to prove that ergodicity holds for any value of 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a. We have already shown that, under the assumptions of Theorem ??, Part
2. our model reproduces the dynamics of the Voter's model. Theorem 7 (p.211)
in Bramson and Grieath (1980) requires the initial condition to be a product
measure (as such translation invariant) and in our model 0 is so by denition.
b. We prove the statement for T = 1: In this case we know (Theorem ??, Part
3.) that, starting from any time T distribution, the system converges to v1. We
here characterize the minimum rate at which this occurs. First notice that, since
 2 (0;1), T = 1 and d = 1; ip rates are given by:
c
c(x;v;;;m) = v(x) + (1   2v(x))[p(x;v) + (1   )]
Hence, starting from v0 (where p(x;v) = 0 for all x), ones are produced by the
poll at rate (1   ) > 0.
Suppose at some time t > T = 0, v(x) = 1 and v(y) = 0 for all y 6= x. The
minimum rate at which this one at x grows into a cluster of two adjacent ones is
computed as follows. Within a small time interval, since at most one voter can
change opinion, three things can happen:
a) v(x) = 1 ips to v(x) = 0, v(x   1) = v(x + 1) = 0. This occurs at rate .
b) v(x) = 1, v(x 1) = 0 ips to v(x 1) = 1;v(x+1) = 0. This occurs at rate
=2 + (1   ).
c) v(x) = 1; v(x+1) = 0 ips to v(x+1) = 1;v(x 1) = 0: This occurs at rate
=2 + (1   ).
Under a) the cluster disappears; under b) or c) the cluster grows by one unit. It
can easily be checked that these are also the (minimum) rates at which a cluster
of at least two adjacent ones grows by one unit. Hence, between T = 0 and t, with
probability one, the cluster size is such that:
j vt j
t Z
0
[2(

2
+ 1   )   ]dt = 2(1   )t
As a result, since  2 (0;1); for t > T:
lim
t!1
j vt j
2t  (1   ) lim
t!1
t
1 
which is equal to 1 for  < 1.